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THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1978: BALANCING ENERGY NEEDS
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS?
The continental shelf' of the United States is a vast, relatively
untapped storehouse of natural resources, the most valuable of
which are oil and gas." The energy potential of this area, if realized,
could bring the United States much closer to energy self-sufficiency'
and its attendant benefits.' However, the shelf and surrounding
coastal environment is important for a variety of other commercial,
ecological and aesthetic reasons.5 Development and production of off-
1. The continental shelf is the relatively shallow extension of the continental
land masses which stretches outward from the shore gradually to an average depth of
660 feet. At its edge the seabed takes a steep decline, known as the continental slope.
The gentler gradient which marks the merger of the slope with the deep seabed is the
continental rise. The shelf, slope, and rise are referred to collectively as the continen-
tal margin. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 91ST CONG. 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE OUTER CONTINEN-
TAL SHELF 222 (Comm. Print 1970), reprinted in L. JUDA, OCEAN SPACE RIGHTS:
DEVELOPING U.S. POLICY 193-94, app. G. (1975).
2. The United States Geological Service (USGS) estimates the undiscovered
recoverable oil and gas resources on the continental shelf to be 26 billion barrels of oil
and 109 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, EFFECTS OF OIL AND
GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL ZONE, 94TH CONG., REPORT ON THE OUTER CONTINEN-
TAL SHELF 64-66 (Comm. Print 1976).
3. Of all domestic oil and gas produced at present, some 17 percent comes from
the continental shelf-about 18 percent of our oil and 15 percent of our natural gas.
However, the prospects are that the continental shelf can be the largest domestic
source of oil and gas between now and the 1990's. H.R. REP. No. 95-590, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 74 (1978), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1481 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as HOUSE REPORT].
4. In testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior and
Related Agencies in 1974, Undersecretary of the Interior John C. Whitaker emphasized
three reasons to lessen dependence upon foreign energy supplies: (1) The importance
of a secure oil and natural gas supply to an independent foreign policy and to national
security; (2) Compelling economic pressures including the need to avoid the inflation
that results when domestic goods must be exported to offset the potential trade im-
balance produced by massive oil imports; and (3) The likelihood that domestic oil and
gas production will be more economical than importation at current and foreseeable
world market prices. Hearings before the House Appropriations Subcomm. on Interior
and Related Agencies, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1974) (remarks by John C. Whitaker,
Undersecretary of the Interior). See generally FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, PRO-
JECT INDEPENDENCE REPORT (1974).
5. Uses include swimming, surfing, skin diving, pleasure boating, sport and com-
mercial fishing, and other related recreational and commercial activities. Additionally,
marine organisms abound in the coastal environment. The biological productivity of
most estuarine areas is fifteen to thirty times that of the open ocean and up to twice
that of the best inland agricultural areas. Hildreth, The Coast: Where Energy Meets
the Environment, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 253, 247-59 (1976). See generally B. KETCHUM,
THE WATER'S EDGE: CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE COASTAL ZONE (1972).
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shore oil and gas, with the accompanying risk of oil spills, pose a
threat to the existing coastal environment which supports these
other uses of coastal areas. In 1978 Congress amended the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act, the primary vehicle by which
OCS lands are leased and regulated,' in order to expedite the
development and production of OCS oil and gas and to provide ade-
quate protection to the coastal environment. This comment will
discuss and analyze the manner in which the amendments seek to
accomplish these dual goals.
Background: A Conflict of National Interests
Offshore drilling for oil and gas began as early as the late 1890's
but was initially confined to shallow nearshore waters because of
the limited technology available As technology advanced, allowing
deeper depths to be penetrated, state and federal governments
became increasingly interested in offshore lands.' By the 1930's
several coastal states had passed legislation controlling the explora-
tion and development of offshore areas.' On September 28, 1945,
President Truman issued a "Proclamation on the Continental
Shelf,"'" claiming all offshore areas to be subject to federal control.
Its primary objective was to facilitate development of OCS
petroleum resources." The Proclamation was later codified by the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf." The Convention
recognized the rights of coastal nations in the continental shelf as
being "exclusive [and] sovereign for the purposes of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources."1
The Truman Proclamation was followed by Supreme Court deci-
sions in 1947" and 19508 in which the Court upheld federal control
of the entire continental shelf. In 1953 Congress responded to these
decisions by passing the Submerged Lands Act," which gave to the
6. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629
(1978).
7. See Krueger, The Development and Administration of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands of the United States, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. INST. 643, 675 (1968).
8. Id at 675-77.
9. Id.
10. PRES. PROC. No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
11. Krueger, International and National Regulation of Pollution from Offshore Oil
Production, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 541, 542 (1970).
12. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T. 311.
13. Id. at art. 2, paras. 1-2.
14. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
15. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339
U.S. 699 (1950).
16. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1953).
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coastal states exclusive rights to resources in the area extending
out to three geographical miles from their coastlines.1
7
Shortly after enactment of the Submerged Lands Act, Congress
enacted the OCS Lands Act in order to assert federal jurisdiction
over lands lying seaward of the three-mile coastal zone given to the
states. 8 The statute gave the Secretary of the Interior the respon-
sibility to supervise OCS lands and, more importantly, the authority
to lease OCS lands for mineral exploitation. 9 The Act also gave the
Secretary broad authority to prescribe rules and regulations
necessary to administer leasing of the OCS."
The OCS leasing process was executed, under regulations pro-
mulgated by the Secretary,2 in an orderly, efficient, and relatively
uncontroversial manner in the 1950's and 1960's. Between the
passage of the OCS Lands Act in 1953 and the year 1968, the
Department of the Interior conducted twenty-three oil and gas lease
sales, covering almost six and one-half million acres." However, OCS
leasing became an increasingly complex and controversial issue in
the 1970's.
17. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970). The Act also allowed extension to the "historical boun-
dary" of states that could prove that such boundary existed at the time of admission of
the state into the Union or had otherwise been confirmed by act of Congress, but in no
event more than three marine leagues (about 10.35 land miles). However, only the
boundaries of Texas and Florida have been extended to this distance. See United
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
This issue was recently litigated by states on the Atlantic coastline in United States v.
Maine, 423 U.S. 1 (1975). Note, States' Rights in the Outer Continental Shelf Denied
by the United States Supreme Court, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203 (1975).
18. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). The term "Outer Continental Shelf" was defined as
all submerged lands under American jurisdiction which lie seaward of the area granted
to the states in the Submerged Lands Act. 43 U.S.C. 1331(a) (1970).
For a discussion of the somewhat "murky" seaward limits of the OCS, see
Schoenberger & Walshe, Outer Continental Shelf Leasing, in LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND
GAS LEASES 303, 304-05 (1978).
19. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) (1) & 1337(a) (1970).
20. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) (1) & 1337(a) (1970). The Secretary delegated this leasing
authority to divisions of the Department of the Interior. By Exec. Order No. 2583, as
amended on September 17, 1954, 18 Fed. Reg. 6126 (1954), he delegated to the Director
of the Bureau of Land Management authority to take any action in connection with the
planning and leasing of OCS tracts. The Director delegated this authority, in turn, to
the Manager of the OCS Office by Exec. Order No. 575, 19 Fed. Reg. 6720 (1954). Once
a lease has been issued, the general supervision and administration thereof has been
vested in the Oil and Gas Supervisor of the United States Geological Survey (USGS).
30 C.F.R. §§ 250.10 to .11 (1959). See Schoenberger & Walshe, supra note 18, at 309.
21. 43 C.F.R. §§ 330 (1977); 30 C.F.R. § 250 (1977). The Department of the Interior
has published two booklets containing information regarding OCS regulations:
POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
IN OIL AND GAS OPERATION ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (June 1977); REGULATIONS
PERTAINING TO MINERAL LEASING OERATIONS AND PIPELINES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF (December 1976).
22. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 74.
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The first major difficulty arose in the wake of the blowout of a
drilling rig in the Santa Barbara Channel in 1969, which resulted in
the largest oil spill in United States history."3 Shortly after the
blowout, the Secretary of the Interior suspended all activities on the
lease upon which the blowout occurred and certain other leases in
the area, pending the completion of environmental studies." In
September, 1971, after completion of the studies, the Secretary an-
nounced that the suspension would continue. The affected lessees
filed suit, questioning the authority of the Secretary to take such ac-
tion.
The district court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton"' held that the
1953 Act did not authorize the Secretary to suspend leases for en-
vironmental purposes. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, 7 finding the following language of the statute to be suffi-
cient authority: "The Secretary may at any time prescribe and
amend such rules and regulations as he determines to be necessary
and proper in order to provide for the prevention of waste and con-
servation of the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf...
"18 Because the OCS Lands Act did not define "natural resources,"
the court turned to the Submerged Lands Act, which defines natural
resources to include not only oil, gas, sulphur, and other minerals,
but also all marine animal and plant life.2' Thus, the Secretary's
suspension of leasing came within his power to provide for the con-
servation of natural resources.
In a subsequent case, Union Oil of California v. Morton,"° the
ninth circuit again upheld the Secretary's authority to suspend
operations, but attempted to place some limits on that authority.
The court ruled that an open-ended, indefinite suspension would con-
stitute a taking of private property for which just compensation
would be required under the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution. 1 Moreover, the court declared that Congress had not
23. See generally L. DYE, BLOWOUT AT PLATFORM A (1971); A. NASH, OIL POLLUTION
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A STUDY OF THE SANTA BARBARA OIL SPILL (1972); Baldwin,
The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 33 (1975); Walrnsley, Oil Pollution
Problems Arising Out of Exploitation of the Continental Shelf. The Santa Barbara
Disaster, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 514 (1972).
24. Note, Environmental Law: Governmental Suspension of Outer Continental
Shelf Oil Drilling Operations, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 930, 931 (1977).
25. Id.
26. 345 F. Supp. 685 (C.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd, 493 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1973).
27. 493 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1973).
28. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1) (1970).
29. 493 F.2d at 145.
30. 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
31. Id. at 751. The court held that such a taking by interference with private pro-
perty rights was within the constitutional power of Congress, but subject to conpensa-
tion to the affected lessees.
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authorized suspensions requiring compensation and that any such
suspension was therefore beyond the Secretary's power.2
Besides generating the first major litigation under the OCS
Lands Act, the Santa Barbara blowout also fostered the first signifi-
cant resistance to OCS leasing by coastal states and environmen-
talists. Through the medium of television, millions of Americans
witnessed the effects of this major oil spill, which ultimately
resulted in the loss of over ten million dollars to the city of Santa
Barbara and the state of California in tourist-oriented business and
in diminution of land values, in addition to causing indeterminable
damage to the marine environment.8
The Santa Barbara spill was a major catalyst of the general en-
vironmental movement which swept the country in the early 1970's.34
Americans realized that our modern industrialized society has been
causing a gradual deterioration in the environment. Congress
reacted, and in many instances overreacted, by passing a plethora of
statutes designed to protect the environment, several of which af-
fected OCS leasing." Three of these acts, the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Coastal Zone Management
Act, have particular significance for the OCS leasing Program; their
impact on the leasing program is summarized below.
National Environment Policy Act (NEPA)
The National Environmental Policy Act" has been referred to as
the "Sherman Act of environmental law."87 It was enacted in order
32. Id.
33. Hildreth, supra note 5, 259-60; Lee, Decision to Lease Outer Continental Shelf
Lands, 2 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 31, 35 (1975).
34. Lee, supra note 33, at 35.
35. E.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970); Coastal
Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1977); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C . §§
7401-642 (1977); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-376 (1977); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34
(1974); Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66(c) (1976).
For a general discussion of the interrelationship of these acts and OCS leasing, see
Cowles, Environmental Regulation of Offshore Exploration, Production and Develop-
ment, 27TH ANNUAL INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 53 (1976); Martin,
Operating Regulations on Offshore Submerged Lands, in LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND
GAS LEASES 899 (1978).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). See generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS
(1973); McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. L.
REV. 801 (1977); Mogel, Energy and the Environment: Must There Be a Choice?, 13
CAL. W. REV. 1 (1976); Comment, Appropriate Scope of an Environmental Impact
Statement: The Interrelationships of Impacts, 1976 DUKE L.J. 623. For a discussion of
NEPA as it relates to OCS leasing, see Hildreth, supra note 5, at 268-84.
37. W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 697 (1977).
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to compel federal agencies to examine environmental factors before
approving federal actions. The heart of NEPA is section 10288 which
requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) for all proposed "major federal actions significantly affec-
ting the quality of the human environment." 9 An EIS must contain a
detailed discussion of the environmental impact of the proposal, any
adverse and unavoidable environmental effects, short-term consump-
tion as compared to long-term productivity, any irreversible and ir-
retrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in
the proposed action, and any feasible alternatives that might exist.'0
The EIS accompanies the proposed action through the reviewing
process of the federal agency, thereby ensuring that environmental
impacts are considered at all stages before approval.
To the extent that leasing activities by the Department of the
Interior are "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment," they are subject to the prescriptions of
NEPA." Although NEPA is not a substantive impediment to OCS
leasing activities, a leasing project on the OCS may be delayed until
an EIS prepared by the Department of Interior complies fully with
NEPA.4
2
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
Congress enacted the CZMA 8 in 1972 in recognition of the many
38. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970). The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) pro-
mulgated final regulations on August 1, 1973, as guidelines for the preparation of an
EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1973). The CEQ advises that the term
major federal action significantly affecting the environment [is] to be construed by
agencies with a view to the overall cumulative impact of the action proposed ....
Such actions may be localized in their impact, but if there is potential that the en-
vironment may be significantly affected, the statement is to be prepared.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1973).
As might be expected, federal courts faced with these vague threshold considera-
tions have construed the provision in a wide variety of ways. For a discussion of the
judicial response, see F. ANDERSON, supra note 36, at 57-141; McGarity, supra note 36.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(i) to (c)v) (1970).
41. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (injunction affirmed preventing OCS lease sale off Louisiana coast
because the EIS did not adequately consider alternatives to offshore leasing).
42. Id.
43. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1972), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-370 § 2, 90 Stat.
1013 (1976), Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 690-3 (1978). See generally Hildreth, supra note
5, at 284-304; Shaffer, OCS Development and the Consistency Provisions of the
Coastal Zone Management Act-A Legal and Policy Analysis, 4 OHIo N.L. REV. 595
(1977); Symposium, Implementation of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16
WM. & MARY L. REV. 717 (1975); Yahner, The Coastal Zone Management Act Amend-
ments of 1976, 1 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 259 (1976); Zile, A Legislative-Political History




conflicting demands made upon shoreline resources." The Act pro-
vides incentives to coastal states to provide for the orderly develop-
ment and protection of the lands and waters of their coastal zones.
It provides for a two-step funding program administered by the
Secretary of Commerce. States are initially granted funds to aid in
the development of state coastal zone management plans. 5 After the
plan is approved by the Secretary, additional funds are awarded to
aid the state in the implementation and operation of the program.'"
Once a state's management plan has been approved, the CZMA con-
tains consistency provisions requiring the federal government to
conform its activities and those of its lessees and permittees to the
state's plan.'
A 1976 amendment to the CZMA clarified the relationship be-
tween state coastal zone management programs and OCS leasing ac-
tivities." The Act now requires OCS lessees who submit a plan to
the Secretary of the Interior for the exploration, development, or
production of an OCS tract to attach a certification stating that each
activity described in the plan which affects any land or water use in
the coastal zone of a state complies with the affected state's coastal
zone management plan.' Normally, a license or permit may not be
granted for any activity described in the plan until the state concurs
with the certification." However, a license or permit may be obtained
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976). The Act was prompted by an increasing population
growth in coastal areas which has placed progressively greater commercial, residen-
tial, and recreational demands upon these ecologically fragile areas. In 1971, 53 percent
of all Americans lived within 50 miles of the coast and estimates predict that by the
year 2000, coastal population will reach 200 million. The development generated by
population growth threatens natural systems such as estuarine and marsh areas.
Yahner, supra note 43, at 260.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (1976).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (1976).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1978). Without the Act's consistency requirements, federal
activities would be immune from state coastal zone regulation under the property and
supremacy clauses of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, art. VI,
cl. 2.
Waiver of intcrgovernmental immunity is a common feature in modern environmen-
tal statutes. See generally Murchison, Waivers of Intergovernmental Immunity in
Federal Environmental Statutes, 62 VA. L. REV. 1177 (1976). For a general discussion
of federal consistency and state coordination under the CZMA, see Brewer, Federal
Consistency and State Expectations, 2 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 315 (1976);
Hershman & Folkenroth, Coastal Zone Management and Intergovernmental Coordina-
tion, 54 ORE. L. REV. 13 (1975).
48. Pub. L. No. 94-370 § 2, 90 Stat. 1013 (1976), amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64
(1972). The amendments are discussed in Yahner, supra note 43, at 269-73; Shaffer,
supra note 43.
49. Pub. L. 95-372, 92 Stat. 690-3 (1978), amending 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1976).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1978).
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without certification if the Secretary of Commerce finds that each
activity is consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or is other-
wise necessary in the interest of national security."
Although the CZMA was enacted in 1972, by 1978 only a few
state management plans had been approved." As a result, the actual
effect of the CZMA upon OCS leasing and its interrelationship with
the OCS Lands Act was uncertain prior to the enactment of the
1978 amendments to the OCS Lands Act.
Clean Air Act (CAA)
The CAA" was enacted to protect and enhance the quality of
the nation's air resources in order to promote public health and
welfare. Basically, the CAA requires the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate national am-
bient air quality standards for any air pollutant which the Ad-
ministrator determines has an adverse effect on public health and
welfare and for which air quality criteria have been established."
The Act delegates to the states the primary responsibility for at-
taining and maintaining these standards through the adoption of
state implementation plans (SIP's) containing emission limitations
and other measures deemed necessary to ensure attainment and
maintenance of the national standards." If a state fails to submit an
implementation plan or if portions of the plan are inadequate to at-
tain or maintain national ambient air quality standards, the Ad-
ministrator is required to promulgate substitute regulations."
On its face, the CAA does not appear to apply to OCS facilities.
The Act makes no mention of its application beyond the territorial
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1978). However, the Act does not provide guidelines
as to when a finding "in the interest of national security" is appropriate.
52. The plans of Washington, Oregon, and California and a portion of Puerto
Rico's plan have recently received approval. Ten additional states are expected to sub-
mit plans during 1978 and 1979. [19781 EN. USERS REP. (BNA), No. 242, at 23.
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-41 (1965), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 712
(1977). See generally Luneburg, The National Quest for Clean Air 1970-1978: Inter-
governmental Problems and Some Proposed Solutions, 73 Nw. L. REV. 397 (1978);
Pendley & Morgan, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: A Selective Legislative
Analysis, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 747 (1978); Comment, State Responsibility for the
Administration of Federal Programs Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970: A
Statutory and Constitutional Analysis, 36 MD. L. REV. 586 (1977); Comment, The Im-
pact of Current Air Pollution Legislation & Litigation on Energy Production, 54 ORE.
L. REV. 515 (1975); Note, Federal Clean Air Policy: Its Uncertain Foundations, 10 IND.
L. REV. 931 (1977).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1977).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1977).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-10 (1977).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1977).
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limits of the various states. However, the Administrator recently
determined that SIP's will be applied to OCS facilities to the extent
that the emission may affect air quality in a coastal state." To
justify this decision, the Administrator turned to the OCS Lands
Act." Section 2031 of that Act provides that the laws of the United
States are applicable to the soil and seabed of the OCS and all ar-
tificial islands and fixed structures located thereon and that the
laws of each adjacent state are applicable to activities on the OCS to
the extent that the state law is not inconsistent with the OCS Lands
Act or other federal law. This determination was made on April 18,
1978, and consequently, its ultimate effect upon OCS leasing was
still uncertain prior to the enactment of the amendments.
The Energy Shortage
Just as the Santa Barbara spill served as the catalyst which
awakened the public's concern for preservation of the environment,
the Arab oil embargo of 1973 was the catalyst which awakened
Americans to the realization that domestic production of oil and gas
must be expedited. After the embargo, President Nixon declared in-
creased self-sufficiency in energy production to be a national goal."
In 1974, when President Nixon greatly accelerated the proposed
acreage of OCS leasing by ordering the Secretary of the Interior to
lease ten million acres the following year, opposition to OCS leasing
increased accordingly."2 OCS leasing quickly became a battleground
for two competing national interests: protection of the environment
and rapid development of domestic energy resources."
The battles were fought by environmentalists and coastal states
using environmental statutes which, unlike the OCS Lands Act,
allowed suits by citizens to question compliance with the various
acts." Numerous lawsuits were filed to oppose OCS leasing, the ma-
58. Applicability of Clean Air Act to Modification of Exxon Corp.'s Platform Hondo,
43 Fed. Reg. 16, 393 (1978). The plight of Exxon's Hondo Platform is fully discussed in
Shaffer, supra note 43.
59. 43 Fed. Reg. at 16, 397.
60. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1978).
61. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 89.
62. Yahner, supra note 43, at 270.
63. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 89.
64. Citizens suits are a rather recent phenomenon. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (1977); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1972),
discussed in Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REV.
1221 (1977).
NEPA does not contain a citizen suit provision. However, courts have consistently
allowed private parties to enforce the Act by relying upon the provisions of the Ad-
minsistrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966), which provides: "A person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency ac-
tion within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to a judicial review thereof."
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jority of which sought compliance with NEPA."5 This resulted in a
significant slowdown in the leasing process." The presence of
voluminous regulations and permit requirements under the several
environmental statutes applicable to OCS leasing also contributed to
the delay. 7
By 1978 the inadequacy of the existing OCS leasing process was
clearly evident. From 1973, when increased self-sufficiency in energy
production became a national goal, to 1978, the percentage of foreign
oil utilized by American industry and consumers increased from
thirty-five percent to over fifty percent." A 1978 study by the
United States Geological Survey indicated that the total time re-
quired after a lease sale to attain peak production would be in the
range of seven to fourteen years." Further, the uncertainty created
by lawsuits brought lower bids for leases by the oil companies."
The future looked even gloomier. The threat of NEPA litigation,
the Secretary's questionable authority to suspend leasing
activities,7 the uncertainties involved in applying the CAA to the
OCS," and the unpredictable use of the CZMA78 by coastal states, all
promised to create additional problems in the OCS leasing process.
Congress realized that in the face of these difficulties neither
preservation of the environment nor efficient developments of OCS
oil and gas could be accomplished without amending the outdated
OCS Lands Act of 1953. 7
See F. ANDERSON, supra note 36, at 26-44; Note, Environmental Law-Standing to
Sue-Alleged Violation of Private Party's Informational Interests in Environmental
Impact Statement is Sufficient to Establish Standing to Enforce National En-
vironmental Policy Act, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1271 (1977).
65. E.g., County of Suffolk v. Department of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir.
1977); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.
1972); California ex re. Younger v. Morton, 404 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See 124
CONG. REC. H190 & H193 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1978) (remarks by Congressmen Fish and
Hughes respectively).
66. See authorities cited at note 65, supra.
67. The regulations and permit requirements are detailed in HOUSE REPORT. supra
note 3, at 2870-78; Cowles, supra note 36; Kellough & Martin, supra note 35, at
899-900.26(6).
68. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 90. Although six domestic lease sales were
scheduled for 1975, only four were conducted. Six sales were also planned for 1976, and
again only four were held. Additionally, another sale was temporarily invalidated. Id.
69. Id at 61.
70. Id. at 90.
71. See notes 23-32, supra, and accompanying text.
72. See notes 43-52, supra, and accompanying text.
73. See notes 53-60, supra, and accompanying text.
74. See Jackson, Rational Development of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas,
54 ORE. L. REV. 567 (1975). In spite of delays and other problems regarding OCS leas-
ing, the oil industry did not desire new legislation. It feared new legislation would fur-
ther delay OCS development because of more regulations, consultations, and citizen
suits. OIL & GAS J., Sept. 25, 1978, at 68.
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The 1978 Amendments to the OCS Lands Act
The OCS Lands Act amendments of 1978, the final product of
four years of Congressional effort, are a response to the failure of
the 1953 Act to consider adequately environmental concerns, as well
as a response to the failure of the Act to provide for rapid develop-
ment of OCS oil and gas within the confines imposed by an en-
vironmentally-conscious public. The findings, purposes, and policies
of the amendments reveal that the amendments are intended to
achieve a balance between the need for expedited development in
the OCS and protection of the coastal environment."5 In its attempt
to combine these seemingly incompatible national policies, Congress
has placed balancing mechanisms in the Act so that administrative
officials can balance environmental and energy factors in their
decision-making capacities under the Act. These provisions will be
discussed as they relate to the three stages of the leasing process:
site-selection, management, and enforcement.
Stage One: Site-Selection
Site-selection encompasses all leasing decisions and activities
which occur prior to actual development of and production from a
lease."8 Balancing mechanisms in the site-selection stage are designed
to help agency officials make rational choices among the competing
values to ensure that areas from which oil and gas are produced will
75. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702 & 1801-02 (1978). Note particularly section 1802 which states
that the purposes of the amendments are to: (1) Establish policies and procedures for
managing the oil and natural gas resources of the OCS which are intended to result in
expedited exploration and development of the OCS in order to achieve national security,
reduce dependence on foreign sources, and maintain a favorable balance of payments
in world trade; (2) Preserve, protect, and develop oil and natural gas resources in the
OCS in a manner which is consistent with the need (A) to make such resources
available to meet the nation's energy needs as rapidly as possible, and (B) to balance
orderly energy resource development with protection of the human, marine, and
coastal environments.
76. The following is a simplified version of the steps involved in the site-selection
stage prior to the amendments: (1) Preparation of lease planning schedule; (2) Request
for tract nominations; (3) Tentative tract selection made from information received in
the request for tract nominations; (4) Draft EIS prepared and made available for public
review, then submitted to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ); (5) Public hear-
ing held for the draft EIS in the vicinity of the proposed sale; (6) Final EIS prepared;
(7) Secretary of the Interior decides whether the sale is to be made, and if so, upon
which tracts and under what lease terms; (8) Notice of sale published in the Federal
Register; (9) Lease sale conducted; (10) Oil and gas lease contract signed; (11) An ex-
ploratory drilling plan prepared and submitted by the lessee to the United States
Geological Survey (USGS), after securing the necessary permits from the Corps of
Engineers and the EPA; (12) Drilling permits issued. HouSE REPORT, supra note 3, at
2874-78.
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be those which are likely to produce the greatest economic gains
and the least amount of environmental damage." However, balanc-
ing is a complex procedure, requiring difficult analysis and a careful
understanding of both the economic and environmental effects of
leasing. 8 There must be tract-by-tract judgment on whether a par-
ticular energy deposit is valuable enough to justify the probable en-
vironmental costs of extracting it." The amendments provide balanc-
ing mechanisms at several points in the site-selection process.
OCS Leasing Program. Section 18 of the amendments directs
the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a five-year leasing program
in which he is required to select the timing and location of leasing to
obtain a proper balance among the potentials for environmental
damage, for discovery of oil and gas, and for adverse impact on the
coastal zone." The balance is to be reached upon a consideration of
the following factors:
(1) existing information concerning the geographical, geological
and ecological characteristics of such regions;
(2) an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and en-
vironmental risks among the various regions;
(3) the location of such regions with respect to, and the relative
needs of, regional and national energy markets;
(4) the location of such regions with respect to other uses of the
sea and seabed;
(5) the interest of potential oil and gas producers in the develop-
ment of oil and gas resources;
(6) laws, goals, and policies of affected States which have been
specifically identified by the Governors of such States as rele-
vant matters for the Secretary's consideration;
(7) the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity
of different areas of the outer Continental Shelf; and
(8) relevant environmental and predictive information for dif-
ferent areas of the outer Continental Shelf. 1
Exploration and Development. After leasing locations are
selected, a balancing will again take place both prior to exploration
of each tract and prior to development and production."2 This balanc-




80. 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (1978).
81. 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (1978).
82. The question of whether environmental factors should be reviewed after a
tract has already been leased was the subject of extensive litigation prior to the
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ing will be accomplished through the evaluation of plans submitted
to the Secretary by OCS lessees.
Under section 206(11) of the amendments, lessees must prepare
exploration plans which are to include a schedule of anticipated ac-
tivities, a description of the equipment to be used, the general loca-
tion of each well to be drilled, and other information deemed perti-
nent by the Secretary.8 The Secretary must approve an exploration
plan within thirty days of its submission, unless he determines that
the proposed activity under the plan will result in serious harm or
damage to life, including fish or other aquatic life, to property, to
any minerals in areas leased or not leased, to national security or
defense, or to the environment.
Section 25 of the amendments requires lessees to submit
development and production plans to the Secretary once the lessee
decides to commence major development on a tract.8 5 These plans
must include a description of the specific work to be performed, a
description of all facilities and operations located on the OCS, a
statement of environmental standards to be met and the manner in
which such standards are to be met, an estimate of the rate of
development and production and a time-table for performance, and
any other relevant information required by the Secretary." The
lessee is additionally required to submit a statement describing
facilities and operations which will be constructed or conducted on-
shore as a consequence of the OCS activity. 7
All lessees in the Gulf of Mexico are exempted from compliance
amendments. Environmentalists contended that the EIS prepared pursuant to NEPA
prior to a lease sale could not adequately predict onshore and environmental impacts
of later production activity, the extent of which would depend entirely upon the
amount of oil and gas found. See Kesterman & Hay, Domestic Offshore Drilling and
U.S. Energy Options, 5 J. MAR. LAW 701, 709 (July 1974). In 1976, the failure to pro-
vide for such a procedure led, in part, a district court to invalidate an entire lease sale.
New York v. Kleppe, 9 ENVIR. REP. 1978 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The second circuit reversed,
primarily upon the assumption that the Secretary of the Interior would amend OCS
regulations to require a second review prior to development of a tract. County of Suf-
folk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1378 (1977), discussed in HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 164. New regulations were issued on January 27, 1978, which
are quite similar to the Exploration Plan and Development and Production Plan re-
quirements included in the amendments. 43 Fed. Reg. 3880 (1978).
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(11)(c)(3) (1978).
84. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(11)(c)(1) (1978).
85. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (1978). The House Ad Hoc Committee noted that in many
cases there is no true separation between exploration and production. However, there
is a point in time when a lessee has to decide whether or not he is going to order a
drilling platform, seek related onshore support facilities, and commence substantial
development and production in an area. At this point the development and production
plan must be prepared and submitted. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 3, at 165.
86. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c) (1978).
87. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(2) (1978).
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with this procedure."' Congress excepted the Gulf because it was
deemed inappropriate to apply these requirements in areas which
have already undergone substantial leasing activity."
The Secretary must disapprove a development and production
plan if the lessee fails to demonstrate that it complies with the re-
quirements of the Act or other applicable federal law, or if the
operations threaten national security or national defense." The
Secretary must also disapprove plan if he determines that because
of exceptional circumstances, implementation of the plan would pro-
bably cause serious harm or damage to life, property, mineral
deposits, national security or national defense, or the environment;
that the threat of harm or damage will not disappear or decrease to
an acceptable extent; and that the advantages of disapproving the
plan outweigh the advantages of development and production. 1
State and Local Government Participation. Balancing
mechanisms have also been incorporated in the amendments to
allow state and local governments to participate in the leasing pro-
cess without undue delay to OCS leasing. State and local govern-
ments were particularly displeased with the 1953 Act because they
felt they were not given a right to meaningful participation in site-
selection decisions, nor were they given any of the revenues
generated by OCS lease sales. They argued that they were entitled
to participate because it was their beaches and estuaries damaged
by oil spills and their towns and communities coping with the pro-
blems of rapid onshore expansion and development, the progeny of
OCS leasing."
88. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (1978). Additionally, all existing leases issued prior to the
date of enactment are exempted if oil and gas had already been discovered in paying
quantities. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (1978).
89. HouSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 165. The House amendment required only
lessees in "frontier areas" in which no prior exploration and production activities had
taken place to submit development and production plans. This would have exempted
several areas outside the Gulf, including the Santa Barbara Channel. See H.R. REP. No.
1474 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1978), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3080
(1978) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT]. Assuming the rationale for exemp-
ting the Gulf is correct, there is no logical reason for not exempting all "non-frontier
areas.
90. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(h)(1) (1978).
91. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(h)(1) (1978).
92. Oil-related developments are likely to require large numbers of construction
workers for four to six years. A platform fabrication plant may employ up to 2,000
workers for two years. An oil refinery may require 2,000 workers for construction, but
only 300 for operation. Construction for commercial enterprises occurs over a longer
period of time. A Louisiana study estimates that each offshore job produces 1.7 jobs in
oil and gas-related onshore activities and that each of these jobs generates 2.1 jobs in
the service sector. Hildreth, supra note 5, at 256-66. See Breeden, Federalism and the




To a certain extent, the CZMA was enacted to respond to these
arguments." As noted earlier, it provides coastal states with funds
to combat the consequences' of OCS leasing and requires OCS
lessees to certify that their activities which affect the coastal zone
of a state will be conducted in a manner consistent with the state's
coastal zone management plan."4 If a state refuses to certify an ac-
tivity, such activity can only be conducted if the Secretary of Com-
merce finds that it is consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or
is otherwise necessary in the interest of national security."' The
OCS Lands Act amendments incorporate these certifcation pro-
cedures into the OCS Lands Act. Lessees are required to comply
with the certification procedures under the CZMA before the
Secretary may approve an exploration plan" or a development and
production plan.'
The amendments go further than the CZMA and provide coastal
states a more direct means to participate in OCS leasing decisions.
Under the OCS Leasing Program, the governor of any affected state
may identify any laws, goals, and policies of his state which he
deems to be relevant matters for the Secretary of the Interior's con-
sideration." These laws, goals, and policies are to be among the fac-
tors considered by the Secretary in the selection and timing of lease
sales."
In addition, governors and local officials are encouraged to sub-
mit comments and recommendations prior to the approval of the
OCS Leasing Program."' Section 19 of the amendments attempts to
ensure that these comments are given adequate consideration.
Under section 19, the Secretary is obligated to accept the recom-
mendations of a governor if he determines they provide a
reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being
of the citizens of the affected state."' The determination of national
interest is to be based on the desirability of obtaining oil and gas
Disputes between states and the federal government regarding control of onshore
energy facilities present additional OCS leasing problems. See generally Whitney,
Siting of Energy Facilities in the Coastal Zone-A Critical Regulatory Hiatus, 16 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 805 (1975).
93. See notes 43-52, supra, and accompanying text.
94. See text at notes 44-47, supra.
95. See text at notes 48-51, supra.
96. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(2) (1978).
97. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(d) (1978).
98. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(F) (1978). See text at note 81, supra.
99. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(F) (1978).
100. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(F) (1978).
101. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c) (1978).
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supplies in a balanced manner and on the findings, purposes, and
policies of the Act.
112
A similar procedure has been combined with the requirements
of NEPA to ensure adequate state and local government participa-
tion prior to final approval of development and productin plans. Or-
dinarily approval of each development and production plan submit-
ted by lessees will not be a "major federal action" which will require
preparation of an EIS. However, the amendments require the
Secretary to declare the approval of a development and productin
plan to be a "major federal action" for purposes of preparing an EIS
in accordance with NEPA, at least once in each region of the OCS."'0
Preparation of an EIS will ensure a more thorough consideration of
environmental impacts and feasible alternatives upon an individual
tract at least once in each region."°4 A draft EIS will be transmitted
to the governor of any affected state and upon request, to local state
executives.'00 When approval of a development and productin plan
has not been designated to be a "major federal action" by the
Secretary, the governors of affected states, plus executives of af-
fected local governments, may submit comments and recommenda-
tions.'"
OCS Information Programs. Because a balancing approach calls
for a tract-by-tract decision-making process, it demands an enormous
amount of information, both as to prospective amounts of oil and gas
and as to likely environmental effects."7 The amendments provide
for the establishment of an Environmental Studies Program and an
OCS Oil and Gas Information Program to provide the requisite data.
Under the provisions for Environmental Studies,1°" the Secretary
will conduct studies of any area or region included in an oil and gas
lease in order to establish information needed for assessment and
102. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c) (1978). The Secretary's determination is final, and shall only
be a basis for invalidation of a proposed lease sale or development and production plan
by a citizen suit if found to be artibrary and capricious. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(d) (1978).
103. 43 U.S.C. § 1351 (1978). Ordinarily, approval of a development and production
plan will not be a "major federal action significantly affecting the environment" and
would therefore not be subject to NEPA. See notes 36-42, supra, and accompanying
text.
104. Although the requirements of a development and production plan are similar
to those of an EIS prepared pursuant to NEPA, an EIS is prepared by a federal agency
rather than a lessee, and requires a broader perspective which includes consideration
of feasible alternatives. See notes 37-43, supra, and accompanying text.
105. 43 U.S.C. § 1351 (1978).
106. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(g) (1978). Section 19, which requires the Secretary to accept
comments from the governor of an affected State if they provide a reasonable balance
between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected states,
is applicable in this instance.
107. INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES. supra note 77, at 227.
108. 43 U.S.C. § 1346 (1978).
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management of environmental impacts on the OCS and coastal
areas."°' Subsequent to leasing, the Secretary is required to conduct
additional studies and to monitor the environment in order to iden-
tify any significant changes in its quality and productivity."' The Oil
and Gas Information Program' complements these Environmental
Studies by requiring lessees to provide the Secretary access to all
processed, analyzed and interpreted information obtained from leas-
ing activities."'
Provisions are included which permit the public and affected
state and local governments to benefit from these information pro-
grams. The Secretary will make available to the general public an
assessment of the cumulative effect of leasing activities on the en-
vironment at the end of each fiscal year."' Affected states are entitled
to receive copies of all relevant programs, plans, reports, EIS's, and
other lease sale information;"' they are also entitled to receive a
summary of data prepared by the Secretary which is designed to
assist in planning for onshore impacts of possible oil and gas
development and production."1
Evaluation. The implementation of balancing mechanisms at
several stages in the site-selection process is an ideal method by
which energy and environmental conflicts may be resolved. The ef-
fectiveness of the Secretary's balancing efforts will be enhanced by
input from state and local governments and data provided by the in-
formation programs. However, balancing is an intricate process, and
certain aspects of the site-selection provisions militate against
achieving the results desired at this stage.
To a certain extent, Congress has used the balancing approach
to relegate to the Secretary of the Interior (and ultimately, to the
courts) its responsibility for making fundamental policy decisions on
values which will set the country's course for the future. The
109. 43 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1978).
110. 43 U.S.C. § 1346(d) (1978). Note that information obtained by this program will
be almost identical to the information required to prepare an EIS under NEPA.
Hopefully, information obtained through the OCS Information Program and NEPA will
be utilized in such a manner as to avoid unnecessary and costly duplication.
111. 43 U.S.C. § 1352 (1978).
112. 43 U.S.C. § 1352(a)(1)(A) (1978). Because much of this information may be
privileged or proprietary information, the amendments authorize the Secretary to
prescribe regulations and take other measures to assure that confidentiality will be
maintained at all times. 43 U.S.C. § 1352(c) to (h) (1978).
113. 43 U.S.C. § 1346(e) (1978).
114. 43 U.S.C. § 1352(d) (1978).
115. 43 U.S.C. § 1352(b) (1978). Note also that development and production plans
must include a statement describing facilities and operations which will be constructed
onshore, which will give affected states other important information. See text at note
87, supra.
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amendments skirt the difficult question of relative weights to be
given to environmental values and energy needs. As a result, Con-
gress has given the Secretary of the Interior much discretion and
little substantive guidance in the balancing process.
Another problem is the fragmentation of the balancing process
between the secretaries of the Interior and of Commerce. Conflic-
ting policy directives given to each secretary by Congress compound
the problem. The overriding concern of the Secretary of Commerce
under the CZMA is protection of the coastal environment from
adverse impact caused by OCS development. On the other hand, the
Secretary of the Interior's concern under the OCS Lands Act is to
proceed with development of the outer continental shelf while
minimizing environmental impacts. As a result, the two secretaries
are empowered to make decisions regarding the same subject mat-
ter under separate acts whose objectives are not entirely consistent.
To the extent that these objectives differ, achieving the desired
balancing under the OCS Act may be thwarted."' 6
Finally, even if an effective balance is possible in the site-
selection process, the goal of expedient development of OCS energy
resources may not be reached. Congress has not only failed to
streamline the site-selection process, but has added other time-
consuming steps."7 Only the exemptions of the Gulf of Mexico from
development and production plans and the time limits for the
preparation of exploration and development and production plans
reveal congressional concern with expedient development.
Stage Two: Management
Management involves the regulation of OCS activities conducted
pursuant to OCS leases. The question here is not whether predicted
energy dividends will exceed environmental costs, but whether
regulations promulgated to protect the environment in the operation
of offshore platforms will unreasonably delay production of OCS oil
and gas or make such production economically unfeasible for OCS
lessees. Under the 1953 Act the Secretary was given unrestricted
authority to promulgate regulations deemed to be necessary to
manage OCS activities."8 In the amendments the Secretary retains
much of his former rule-making autonomy. The amendments do not
contain a balancing mechanism to be utilized in general management
decisions per se, but the Secretary is explicitly required to consider
116. For a detailed discussion of the problem of fragmentation created by the con-
sistency provisions of the CZMA, see Shaffer, supra note 43.
117. See notes 80-115, supra, and accompanying text.
118. See notes 19-21, supra, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40
COMMENTS
available relevant environmental information in developing ap-
propriate regulations for OCS lessees. " 9 Additionally his decisions
should be influenced by the dual aims of the amendments as art-
culated by Congress through its "Findings and Purposes."'2 The
amendments do require the Secretary to issue specific regulations in
the three instances discussed below.
Suspension and Cancellation of Leases. As noted earlier, litiga-
tion followed the Santa Barbara oil spill questioned the authority of
the Secretary to suspend activities on OCS leases and raised ques-
tions regarding compensation for lost use of leases. 2' The amend-
ments dispel all doubts regarding the Secretary's authority to sus-
pend leases and also give him the authority to cancel leases. The
Secretary is authorized to adopt regulations to provide for the
suspension or temporary prohibition of OCS activities at the request
of the lessee, in the national interest, to facilitate proper develop-
ment of a lease, or to allow for the construction or negotiation for
use of transportation facilities.22 Further, he is authorized to enact
regulations to provide for the suspension of OCS activities if he
determines there is a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate
harm or damage to human or aquatic life, to property, to any
mineral deposits, or to the environment.'
After a suspension or temporary prohibition has been in effect
for five years, the Secretary may conduct a hearing to determine
whether a lease should be cancelled."' If he determines, after the
hearing, that continued activity pursuant to such lease would pro-
bably cause serious harm or damage to human or aquatic life, to pro-
perty, to any mineral, to the national security or defense, or to the
environment; that the threat of harm or damage will not disappear
or decrease to an acceptable extent within a reasonable period of
time; and that the advantages of cancellation outweigh the advan-
tages of continuing the lease in force, he may cancel the lease.'2
These provisions provide an effective balance between en-
vironmental and energy goals. To suspend leasing activity only one
of several factors must be present. This allows the Secretary to halt
leasing activity for any of a variety of reasons which may threaten
the environment. He may then carefully plan any future course of
conduct. On the other hand, to cancel a lease each of several factors
119. 43 U.S.C. § 1346(d) (1978).
120. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-02 (1978).
121. See notes 23-33, supra, and accompanying text.
122. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(5)(a)(1) (1978).
123. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(5)(a)(1) (1978).
124. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(5)(a)(2) (1978).
125. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(5)(a)(2) (1978).
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must be present, one of which consists of a finding that the en-
vironmental advantages of cancellation outweigh the economical ad-
vantages of maintaining the lease in force.
The amendments provide for compensation to the lessee in the
event a lease is cancelled. The lessee is entitled to either (1) the
lesser of the fair value of the cancelled rights as of the date of
cancellation, taking account of both anticipated costs and revenues,
or (2) the excess, if any, over the lessee's revenue from the lease of
all consideration paid for the lease and all direct expenditures made
by the lessee after the date of issuance of such lease."2 6
This compensation clause is arguably unconstitutional. As noted
earlier, in Union Oil of California the ninth circuit held that an ab-
solute suspension is tantamount to a taking."' A cancellation is
clearly a permanent suspension and a taking. A long line of Supreme
Court cases requires that the owner or lessee receive reasonable
value for the property or right lost, measured at the time of the tak-
ing. 28 Under the act, in the case of a profitable lease where invest-
ment costs have been fully amortized, the lessee may be entitled to
nothing."
Air Emission Standards and the Clean Air Act. The amend-
ments authorize the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regula-
tions which provide for the compliance of OCS activities with the na-
tional ambient air quality standards established pursuant to the
126. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(5)(a)(2)(L) (1978). The compensation provision is not retroac-
tive. The amendments provide for just compensation should any leases issued before
the date of enactment be cancelled. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(5)(a)(2)(L) (1978).
Special compensation provisions are provided in instances where a lease is cancelled
or suspended because the lessee did not submit an approvable exploration and produc-
tion plan. If a plan is disapproved because the lessee fails to show that he can comply
with the requirements of the Act, or because of no concurrence with a state consistency
certificate, and the lease was issued after approval of a coastal zone management pro-
gram, the lessee will not receive compensation. However, if a plan is disapproved
because it threatens national security, is a threat to life or other resources, or fails to
get coastal zone management plan consistency concurrence for a lease issued prior to
the approval of a state coastal zone management plan, which plan is submitted to the
Secretary, the term of the lease will be duly extended and at any time within five
years, the lessee can reapply to the Secretary with a new plan. At the end of the five
years, the Secretary must cancel the lease if he has not yet approved the plan and the
lessee will be entitled to receive compensation in the normal manner. 43 U.S.C. §
1351(h)(2) (1978).
127. See notes 30-32, supra, and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942); West v. Chesapeake &
P. Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935).
129. This argument was presented to Congress by Congressman Wiggins. 124
CONG. REc. H302 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1978). Apparently, supporters of the provision felt
the constitutional right to fair compensation may be waived if such a waiver is included
in future leases. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 305-06.
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CAA to the extent they "significantly affect" the air quality of any
state.' 0 Comments by the Conference Committee indicate that if an
approved state implementation plan has ambient air quality stan-
dards which are more stringent than the national standards, the
Secretary shall ensure that OCS operations do not prevent attain-
ment of those standards."'
Congress rejected a proposal to require that the air mass above
the OCS in general be brought into compliance with CAA
standards."' The Conference Report indicates that the regulations to
be promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to this section need only
apply to the air above or near an offshore facility, in order that
emissions from each source may be controlled to prevent a signifi-
cant effect on the air quality of the adjacent shore area."'
This provision strikes an effective balance between environmen-
tal and energy concerns. Regulations promulgated by the Secretary
can be less stringent than those of adjacent states and of the CAA
and need only apply to OCS facilities located near the three-mile
coastal zone of the states. However, the provision leaves many
unanswered questions. The act does not define the term "significant-
ly affect," does not direct the Secretary to sources for analysis of
this important term, and fails to clarify when and where the policies
of the CAA apply."4 Furthermore, the Conference Committee
Report states that this provision of the amendments is not intended
to supersede the CAA or the responsibilities of the Administrator of
the EPA."' This may lead to confusion and inconsistent sets of
regulations because the amendments apparently intend to authorize
two departments to regulate air quality in the OCS." 6
Improvement of Drilling Technology. Section 21 of the amend-
ments provides that the Secretary of the Interior and the Coast
Guard, in exercising their respective responsibilities for installations
on the OCS, must require the use of the best available and safest
technologies determined to be economically feasible on new drilling
and production operations, whenever failure of equipment would
have a significant effect on safety, health, or the environment."'
These requirements also apply to existing operations whenever the
130. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(5)(a)(8) (1978). See notes 53-60, supra, and accompanying text.
131. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 89, at 85-86.
132. Id.
133. 1&
134. These questions and others have been raised by the Secretary of the Interior.
43 Fed. Reg. 60, 612 (1978).
135. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 89, at 85-86.
136. See 124 CONG. REC. H314 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1978) (remarks by Congressman
Brown).
137. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (1978).
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Secretary determines they are practical. 8' However, these re-
quirements are balanced against economic considerations. In either
instance, use of the best available and safest technologies will not be
required if the Secretary of the Interior or the secretary of the
department under which the Coast Guard is operating determines
that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient to justify the
incremental cost of utilizing such technologies.18 '
Evaluation. Congress has wisely left management of the OCS
primarily under the control of the Secretary of the Interior. This
allows the Secretary flexibility to change management regulations
to reflect the changing nature of technology and economics upon a
proper balancing of the conflicting national interests. Congress made
inroads upon this authority only where necessary to clarify existing
problems. However, as discussed previously, in answering these prob-
lems, Congress has created other problems. Only the drilling tech-
nology requirements appear to create a process in which effective
balancing can be achieved without further legislation or litigation.
Stage Three: Enforcement
Enforcement concerns the following controversial issues: (1) Who
will be allowed to question compliance with the OCS Lands Act, and
the regulations promulgated thereunder and (2) In what manner is
this enforcement to be accomplished? In the enforcement stage, the
primary concern is to provide methods which will ensure compliance
with the Act by both federal agencies and OCS lessees, without
delaying the production of oil and gas in the OCS. The amendments
include two modes of enforcement, one by federal agencies and the
other by citizen suits, and they also provide an Oil Spill Liability
Fund intended to compensate injured parties for losses incurred as
the result of oil pollution.
Enforcement by Federal Agencies. Federal agencies are, of
course, the traditional enforcers of federal acts. The amendments
seek to increase the effectiveness of this means of enforcement by
expanding the investigatory powers of the involved agencies and by
increasing penalties for violations of the Act." The former has been
accomplished by requiring lessees to allow prompt access to all in-
spectors to the site of any operations subject to safety regulations."'
Upon request, inspectors must be provided with documents and
records that are pertinent to occupational or public health, safety, or
138. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (1978).
139. 43'U.S.C. § 1347(b) (1978).
140. 43 U.S.C. § 1348 (1978).
141. 43 U.S.C. § 1348(a)(3) (1978).
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environmental protection."" Scheduled onsite inspections are to be
conducted at least once a year on all OCS facilities, and other inspec-
tions are to be conducted periodically without advance notice, to
assure compliance with environmental and safety regulations."'
Penalties under the 1953 Act were rendered totally inadequate
by years of inflation. Under the 1953 Act a knowing and willful
violation was a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than
$2,000 or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.1'
Each day of violation was deemed a separate offense."' A similar
violation under the 1978 amendments may be punishable by a fine of
not more than $100,000, or by imprisonment of not more than ten
years, or both.'46
The amendments further provide a civil penalty of $10,000 per
day for a failure to comply with the Act and accompanying regula-
tions, after notice of such failure and the expiration of a reasonable
time for corrective action."' Liability under the Act is extended to
officers and agents of corporations. Whenever a corporation is sub-
ject to prosecution for a knowing and willful violation, an officer or
agent of the corporation or entity who knowingly and willfully
authorized, ordered, or carried out the proscribed activity is subject
to the same fines or imprisonment."8
The expanded investigatory powers of the Secretary of the In-
terior and the Coast Guard, as well as the increased penalties,
should adequately deter violations of OCS safety and environmental
regulations and thereby prevent damage to the environment. It may
be questioned whether multi-billion dollar oil corporations will be
adequately deterred from violations by fines of $10,000 a day, when
these corporations might willingly risk fines when higher profits
could probably be made through noncompliance. However, even
assuming some corporations would operate in this manner, the of-
ficers who knowingly authorize such proscribed activity are also
subject to fines and imprisonment under the amendments. Few in-
vididuals will find intentional noncompliance to be a feasible alter-
native under these circumstances. Of course, the diligence with
which the Secretary and the Coast Guard undertake enforcement
will ultimately determine the effectiveness of these enforcement
procedures.
142. 43 U.S.C. § 1348(a)(3) (1978).
143. 43 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1978).
144. 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1970).
145. 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1970).
146. 43 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1978).
147. 43 U.S.C. § 1350(b) (1978).
148. 43 U.S.C. § 1350(d) (1978).
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Enforcement by Citizens. Citizen suit provisions have become a
common, and very controversial, feature of recent environmental
statutes.' The merits and drawbacks of citizen suit provisions have
been elaborately discussed elsewhere. 5 ' It should suffice for pur-
poses of this comment to say that citizen suits are valuable in that
they expose questionable decision-making approaches in federal
agencies to public view and subject such approaches to judicial
scrutiny. However, they are also extremely costly and provide a
means by which litigious individuals can harrass federal agencies
and engender great delays in land-use programs.5 '
Congress, despite much internal opposition,"' included a liberal
citizen suit provision in the amendments. Under section 23 of the
amendments, any person having a valid legal interest which is or
may be adversely affected has the right to commence a civil action
on his own behalf to compel compliance with the OCS Lands Act or
regulations promulgated thereunder."8 The House Report indicates
that the term "valid legal interest" is to be interpreted broadly to
include not only those individuals who have an economic interest, or
who have suffered or will probably suffer tortious injury, but also
those who may have a definable aesthetic or environmental
interest."'
These broad standing requirements are subject to restriction in
only a few instances. Suits regarding actions by the Secretary to ap-
prove a leasing program, an exploration plan, or development and
production plan may only be brought by a person who (1) par-
ticipated in the administrative proceedings related to these actions,
149. See note 64, supra
150. See generally J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971); Crampton, Citizens
Suits in the Environmental Field-Peril or Promise?, 25 AD. L. REV. 147 (1973);
DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Administrative Process: Empricial
Findings, Remaining Issues and A Direction for Future Research, 1977 DUKE L.J. 409;
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 508 (1974).
151. DiMento, supra note 150.
152. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. H291 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1978) (remarks of Cong-
gressman Krueger); 124 CONG. REC. S13995 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1978) (remarks of
Senator Barlett); HOUSE REPORT. supra note 3, at 308-09.
153. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(1) (1978).
154. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 161. The Report notes that "the Committee in-
tends that this includes persons who meet the requirement for standing to sue set out
by the Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)." HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 161. In that case the Court established very broad standing re-
quirements, holding that persons may obtain standing for judicial review of federal
agency action if they allege that the challenged action caused them injury in fact, and
if the alleged injury was to an interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated" by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have
violated. 405 U.S. at 733.
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(2) is adversely affected or aggrieved by the action, (3) files a peti-
tion for review of the Secretary's action within sixty days after the
date of such action, and (4) promptly transmits copies of the petition
to the Secretary and to the Attorney General.'5 5 Beyond these minor
restrictions, Congress made no attempt to limit or discourage the
bringing of citizen suits by parties who might use the provision for
purposes of harrassment and delay. One manner in which this could
have been accomplished is the inclusion of provisions for the imposi-
tion of court costs. However, Congress left the decision regarding
court costs entirely within the discretion of the federal courts by
allowing them to "award fees to any party, whenever the court
determines such award to be appropriate."'5 6 This provision allows a
court to award costs to either party, regardless of the ultimate out-
come of the suit.
157
Oil Spill Liability and Recovery. Title III of the amendments
provides a long-awaited remedy for parties economically injured by
oil pollution;' through the establishment of the Oil Spill Liability
The Sierra Club case was decided under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1966). See note 64, supra. Subsequent cases under the APA seem to in-
dicate that the Supreme Court may be applying a stricter standard today. For exam-
ple, in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), the Court determined that a plaintiffs alleged in-
jury must be sufficiently concrete and immediate in order to provide a basis for stand-
ing. In another case, United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), the Court
denied the plaintiff standing, relying in part on its determination that the plaintiff was
seeking admission to a federal court merely to air his generalized grievances. These
cases did not involve environmental issues; however, recent district court decisions
have followed the Supreme Court's trend toward a more stringent application of the
doctrine's limitations in environmental cases. See, e.g., Sadler v. 218 Housing Corp.,
417 F. Supp. 348 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Concerned About Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F.
Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1975); Citizens for Food and Progress, Inc. v. Musgrove, 397 F. Supp.
397 (N.D. Ga. 1975). See Note, supra note 64.
155. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c) (1978).
156. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (1978). This discretion to award court costs whenever
deemed "appropriate" is also the standard in other acts. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(d) (1977); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1972);
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1972). See
also Note, Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington Awarding Attorney's
Fees in Citizen Suits to Enforce the Clean Air Act, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1402 (1977).
Congressman Fish introduced an unsuccessful amendment during the debates on
the 1978 OCSLA amendments which would have required the courts to award costs to
an opposing party upon a finding that the litigation was frivolous, or brought primarily
for the purpose of delay. 124 CONG. REC. H569 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978) (remarks of Cong-
ressman Fish). Under this amendment the decision to award costs would still be in the
hands of the courts, but it would give the courts a clear policy directive to discourage
all frivolous litigation.
157. 124 CONG. REC. H568 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978) (remarks of Congressman
Murphy).
158. Under regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1953 Act, 30 C.F.R. § 250.43(b)
(1977), platform operators were strictly liable for cleanup costs resulting from spills on
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Fund, Title III provides an efficient and orderly method to allow
recovery for both cleanup costs and damages resulting from oil
spills.
Under title III, injured parties may assert claims for economic
losses arising out of oil pollution for removal costs, injury to real or
personal property or natural resources, and for the loss of profits or
impairment of earning capacity due to injury to real or personal pro-
perty or natural resources.159 There are limitations placed upon the
assertion of some of these claims. A claim for injury or destruction
of natural resources can only be asserted by the President or by a
state.'" Additionally, only those claimants who derived at least
twenty-five percent of their earnings from an activity which utilized
real or personal property or natural resources damaged by a spill
may recover for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity
resulting from the spill."' 1
The amendments impose liability upon the owners and operators
of vessels or offshore facilities which are the source of oil pollution.
These individuals are responsible for all cleanup costs incurred by
federal, state, and local governments regardless of the cir-
cumstances under which the oil spill occurred."' However, limitation
of liability and certain defenses, such as causation of the spill by
negligence of a third party or causation by a grave natural disaster,
may be asserted in response to claims for actual damages created by
a spill.'
The Oil Spill Liability Fund is an alternative to recovery of
cleanup costs and actual damages through court action, which is
often prolonged and expensive. It is to be established and maintain-
ed by the imposition of a fee, not to exceed three cents per barrel,.
upon oil obtained in the OCS and by subrogation of the Fund to the
rights of governmental agencies and private parties who recover
from the Fund."'
The Fund serves two basic functions. First, it is immediately
OCS waters, with no limit placed upon the amount of liability, but were not liable for
actual damages created by such spills.
Title III applies only to spills from any offshore facility in the OCS and any
transportation device, while in OCS waters, including vessels for the delivery of the oil
and gas from the offshore facility. Comprehensive legislation, which would apply to all
spills in the marine environment, will probably be enacted in the near future. HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 178.
159. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(a) (1978).
160. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b) (1978).
161. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(4) (1978).
162. 43 U.S.C. § 1814 (1978).
163. 43 U.S.C. § 1814 (1978).
164. 43 U.S.C. § 1812 (1978).
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available to governmental agencies to finance the removal of spilled
oil and efforts to minimize a spill's impact on public property. " Se-
cond, it is available to claimants for actual damages recoverable
under title III without regard to any legitimate defenses of limita-
tion of liability which might be successfully asserted by the polluter
in court. 6" In both instances, the Fund is subrogated to the
claimant's recovery rights in court, and is therefore subject to
liability limits and defenses which may be asserted by defendants.
7
Evaluation. The problem regarding balancing of environmental
interests and oil production in this stage is that of providing for ef-
fective enforcement without disturbing the balance sought in the
earlier OCS leasing. The expanded enforcement powers of the
Secretary of the Interior and the Coast Guard, combined with the
citizen suit provisions, appear to encourage compliance with the Act.
However, by failing to limit the use of citizen suits, Congress has
left an aspect of the amendments in the hands of the courts, who
have the potential to negate the benefits of balancing. Furthermore,
the amendments expressly leave all remedies under the citizen suit
provisions of NEPA, the CAA, and other environmental statutes to
aggrieved parties.' "
Title III, which establishes the Oil Spill Liability Fund, consists
perhaps more of a remedy than an enforcement procedure, although
theoretically the imposition of stricter standards of liability will
alter the conduct of owners and operators of vessels or offshore
facilities. Establishment of the Fund provides an efficient and
equitable way to compensate all parties for oil-spill-related injuries,
while also allowing polluters to assert fault-related defenses.
Conclusion
- Oil and gas are our only realistic short-term sources of energy,
and the outer continental shelf contains our largest remaining
domestic reserves of these resources. " ' To prevent an ever-
increasing dependence upon unreliable and costly foreign sources of
these minerals, the United States must expedite its production of
domestic oil and gas, especially from the continental shelf. Some
damage to the valuable coastal environment is inevitable, but
165. 43 U.S.C. § 1812(c)(1) (1978).
166. 43 U.S.C. § 1817 (1978).
167. 43 U.S.C. § 1817 (1978). The amendments also contain a Fisherman's Con-
tingency Fund, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1841-47 (1978), which functions in a manner similar to the
Oil Spill Pollution Fund, to provide reasonable compensation for damages to fishing
gear and economic loss due to OCS activities.
168. 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (1978).
169. Shaffer, supra note 43, at 621.
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through a proper balancing of energy needs and environmental fac-
tors, increased production can occur with minimal environmental
damage.
As has been pointed out in this comment, certain aspects of the
amendments militate against the achievement of proper balancing.
For the most part the deficiencies are not so substantial as to impair
totally the achievement of a proper balance between energy and en-
vironmental values. Both values will be considered at several points
in the leasing process prior to actual production. Once production
has started management procedures are designed to achieve the
highest amount of environmental protection economically feasible;
additionally, broader, stricter means of enforcement have been im-
plemented to assure compliance with these management procedures.
If oil pollution should occur the Oil Spill Pollution Fund is designed
to provide for efficient cleanup and to compensate fully parties who
suffer losses or damage.
But, the amendments have one glaring deficiency: the failure to
expedite OCS production. A balancing process which achieves a pro-
per balance only after years of delay will defeat the purpose of the
amendments. Time is of the essence. As President Carter noted in
his State of the Union message on January 19, 1978:
Every day we spend more than $120 million for foreign oil.
This slows our economic growth, it lowers the value of the dollar
overseas, and it aggravates unemployment and inflation here at
home. Now we know what we must do: increase production, we
must cut down on waste, and we must use more of the fuels
which are plentiful and more permanent.7 '
A study made in 1977 by Professor John Moroney, a
microeconomist at Tulane University, estimated that the amend-
ments could create additional delays of up to six years in developing
OCS resources. 7 ' Advocates of the amendments in Congress dismiss-
ed this study as producing "scare-figures,"'7 and asserted that open-
ing up the OCS decision-making process to affected states, local
governments, and the public will eliminate dissatisfaction with OCS
170. State of the Union address (1978), reprinted in part, 124 CONG. REC. H195 (daily
ed. Jan. 25, 1978).
171. Moroney, An Assessment of the Inflationary Impact of the 1977 Amendments
to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. H105-06 (daily
ed. Jan. 23, 1978). Another study, by Dr. Warren F. Rogers, came to a similar conclu-
sion. Rogers, The Economic Impact of the Jackson/Murphy Amendments to the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act on the State of Louisiana (University of Rhode Island,
August 1977).




leasing, the primary cause of leasing delays.' The validity of this
assertion is certainly subject to challenge. Outside participation by
interested persons is an important aspect of the balancing process,
and the amendments should diminish dissatisfaction with OCS leas-
ing by providing an effective means by which such participation will
be allowed; but to assume that affected states, local governments,
and environmentalists will not readily turn to all available citizen
suit provisions to test determinations adverse to their interests
does not seem realistic. Those individuals who will not tolerate any
significant environmental damages, regardless of economic and other
related benefits, will not be satisfied with, nor appeased by the new
balancing procedures."' One wonders how Congress could rely so
totally upon this assumption in a matter which is essential to our na-
tion's economy and security.
Moreover, the amendments do not even address another major
cause of delays, excessive regulatory procedures. In fact, the amend-
ments may create as many as forty new sets of regulations, which
will further complicate, rather than expedite, OCS leasing.'75
As a result, this legislation may seriously hinder our nation's at-
tempt to reduce dependency upon foreign sources of oil and gas. The
courts and affected federal agencies do have an opportunity to
mitigate the ill effects of the amendments. The courts may do so by
discouraging citizen suits intended only for delay. This may be ac-
complished by strictly construing the standing requirements of all
environmental statutes affecting the OCS, by awarding court costs
to the government and oil companies, and by giving greater
deference to decisions by federal agencies. Affected federal agencies
may reduce the ill effects of the amendments by working together
to maximum extent possible under the numerous environmental
173. 124 CONG. REC. H198 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1978) (remarks by Congressman
Zeferetti); 124 CONG. REC. H508 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (remarks by Congressman
Dodd); 124 CONG. REC. H8873 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1978) and 124 CONG. REC. H10008 (daily
ed. Sept. 17, 1978) (remarks by Congressman Murphy).
174. INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES, supra note 77, at 226-30. Kesterman
and Hay explain such an attitude as follows:
Traditionally, the energy crisis is viewed by environmentalists as a crisis of un-
justified energy demand-not a crisis of need. We cannot, they maintain, equate
demands with needs nor our standard of living with current levels of energy con-
sumption. Fossil fuels are a finite resource, that is rapidly being depleted to feed
our present "oil binge" at an incalculatable cost to our environment and to future
generations. We can, they affirm, get along with less energy without a
catastrophic effect on our life style. This can be achieved through energy conser-
vation ....
Kesterman & Hay, supra note 82, at 708-09.
175. 124 CONG. REC. H207 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1978) and 124 CONG. REC. H299 (daily
ed. Jan. 26, 1978) (remarks by Congressman Moore).
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statutes to rid the leasing process of excessive and duplicative
regulations and permit requirements. If the courts and involved
federal agencies do not take such measures, the following statement
by Senator Hatch of Utah may haunt Congress in the years to come:
Most of us in this Chamber at least pay lip service to the
need for increased energy production, and express dismay at the
energy shortages under which our country suffers. But all we
have to do is look at the graphs . . . to see how consistently
legislation passed by this Congress has reduced and eliminated
energy production . ..
When the lights grow dim more frequently, and the wheels
of industry turn more and more slowly, and our people huddle in
their dark and unheated houses, let us remember that those who
vote for the final passage of this bill today are responsible. " '
Gordon L. James
176. 123 CONG. REC. S11982 (daily ed. July 15, 1977).
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